# \*\*INDEX\*\*

CHINA GROWTH GOOD

[Collapse Worse 2](#_Toc299391139)

[Isolationism Turn 3](#_Toc299391140)

[China Growth Good – Global Economy 1/2 4](#_Toc299391141)

[China Growth Good – Regime Collapse 6](#_Toc299391143)

[China Growth Good – South China Sea 7](#_Toc299391144)

[China Growth Good – Nationalism 8](#_Toc299391145)

[China Growth Good – Asian Stability 9](#_Toc299391146)

[A2: Environment 10](#_Toc299391147)

**CHINA GROWTH BAD**

[Collapse Inevitable 11](#_Toc299391148)

[Burnout Turn 12](#_Toc299391149)

[China Growth Bad – Sino-India War 1/2 13](#_Toc299391150)

[China Growth Bad – Sino-Russia War 1/2 15](#_Toc299391152)

[China Growth Bad – South China Sea 17](#_Toc299391154)

[China Growth Bad – Nationalism 18](#_Toc299391155)

[China Growth Bad – Global Warming 19](#_Toc299391156)

[A2: No Chinese Expansion 20](#_Toc299391157)

## Collapse Worse

### Chinese economic collapse presents a greater threat to the US than growth

Yang, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Auckland, Associate Editor of The Australasian Journal of Human Security, and Chair of the NZIIA’s Auckland Branch, ’06 (Jian, September 1, “China’s Rise: The Security Implications” New Zealand International Review, Vol 31 No 5, p 12, lexis)

Policy implications It is important for the rest of the world to appreciate Chinas desire for a peaceful international environment. It has profound implications for the making of policy toward China. Chinas desire for peace means incentives for it to integrate with the international society and this provides a solid basis for engaging China. Some argue that China is simply waiting for the time when it is strong enough to challenge other great powers. Indeed, no one can guarantee that China will not follow this path. However, this is by no means inevitable. There is a good chance that China continues to integrate with the international society, keeps learning the rules of the game and eventually graduates as a good international citizen. Masaru Tamamoto has a vision for China, that is vastly different from that ofrealists: It is hard to imagine how an economically successful China so enmeshed in global capitalism will threaten the very system that made it rich and middle class. Bourgeois success tends to diminish military efficacy in international relations. In the long run, the Chinese threat to the United States, Japan and the world comes from an economically faltering China, not a prosperous, self-confident China. (18) Chinas rise often reminds us of the rise of Japan and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Both resulted in major military clashes. Realists often argue that history repeats itself. This argument neglects the fact that the rise of the United States was peaceful. The United States rose rapidly from 1820 to 1913, which benefitedother great powers. To be more specific, American GDP per capita rose at an average rate of about 1.5 per cent per year, while that of Britain, France, and Germany rose at roughly 1.1-to-1.3 per cent annually. (19) China's rise can be a great opportunity, too. Increasing influenceChina should learn the rules of the game. At the same time, other great powers, especially the United States, should make efforts to accommodate the rise of China. Although China will not be able to substantially challenge the United States strategically in the coming years, its influence is likely to increase. One important reason why the rise of the United States was peaceful was the accommodation of GreatBritain to America's rise. Despite the differences between Anglo-American relations in those years and Sino-American relations today, theUnited States needs to accept China playing a greater role in world affairs and give China due respect.

## Isolationism Turn

### Failure to transition to a market economy causes Chinese isolationism – it’s a bigger internal link to the impacts

Jones, Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, ’04 (Darryll, “The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the Chinese Transitional Economy” George Washington International Law Review, 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 71, lexis)

The foregoing analysis suggests a potential solution regarding the need to assist transition without affecting secondary outcomes. Logically, China should be most receptive to altruistic investment flowing from countries other than the United States. Non-U.S. altruistic investment would assist the transition process without necessarily introducing U.S.-style democratic values in China. Again, such investment would not be neutral with regard to strengthening China's present governmental reform, but neither would anything else that actually assisted the transition process by dampening social discontent. Meeting social welfare needs, though doing so is essential to the transition process, will invariably decrease motivations to challenge the present form of government. From a U.S. perspective, then, the choice is really only between assisting and not assisting the transition irrespective of any secondary consequences because China's failure to achieve a market economy is fraught with as many negative consequences, if not more, than a successful transition that also strengthens its present [\*138] governmental system. 243 A failure to achieve a market economy would result in China's remaining isolated and defensive with regard to the global community and it is this isolated and defensive posture from which conflict becomes more likely. 244 A successful transition, even one that also strengthens the present political structure, would at least decrease China's isolation and defensiveness. Successful transition would also make it more expensive for China and the United States to engage in geopolitical conflict. To the extent China becomes vested in a smoothly functioning global economy, it is more likely to cultivate friendly and open relations with the United States and other countries. Non-U.S. altruistic investment comes closest to achieving the immediate goal shared by both China and the United States, while also remaining neutral with respect to negative consequences, or at least not increasing the chances that what are viewed as negative consequences by either country will come to fruition.

## China Growth Good – Global Economy 1/2

### Lack of Chinese imports causes global economic collapse, nationalism, and war over Taiwan

Lewis, Research Director of the Economic Research Council, ’07 (Dan, April 19, “The nightmare of a Chines economic collapse” World Finance, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/137/ARTICLE/1144/2007-04-19.html)

A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

### Investment in Chinese growth solves US interest and transition to a market economy – short circuits their impacts

Jones, Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, ’04 (Darryll, “The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the Chinese Transitional Economy” George Washington International Law Review, 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 71, lexis)

II. The Role of Altruistic Investment in a Transition Economy International altruistic investment can significantly further the immediate economic goal sought by China and the United States. That goal is the successful transition to a market economy. Both countries pursue this goal only through international economic investment while ignoring the role international altruistic investment may play in achieving transition and its accompanying consequences. Granted, the two countries have mutually exclusive political goals. China seeks not only to fuel economic growth, necessary to feed and provide other life necessities for its huge population, 23 but also to fund its goal of becoming a major world power without altering its political system. 24 The United States wants not only to gain access to a huge consumer population, but also hopes that a transition to a market economy will lead to a democratic political system in China. 25 Altruistic investment is conducive to both countries' [\*80] immediate goal of successful transition. In short, gifts, donations, and charitable activities originating from abroad decrease the economic pain and shock suffered domestically by those who undertake and are most directly affected by the transition from a socialist to a market economy. By doing so, international altruistic investment accelerates and increases the chances that a market economy will succeed, rather than be defeated by reactionary forces. Altruistic investment might also bring with it Western ideas of democracy, but at the same time it will lessen or eliminate economic motivations to challenge the incumbent political system. The impact on the two countries' differing political goals - strengthening (China's goal) or weakening (the United States' goal) the Chinese government - should therefore be neutral. That is, altruistic investment will expose Chinese citizens to democratic ideals but those same citizens'growing prosperity made possible by altruistic investment will decrease social discontent and the motivations to mount political challenges. The evident task, one undertaken in Section V, is to determine and then deconstruct the precise reasons for the neglect and discouragement of altruistic investment. After doing so, readers should conclude that the apparent disdain for international altruistic investment is not simply an anachronistic relic of the Cold War. There are logical reasons why both governments would actually want to discourage international altruistic investment, even as one country is required to accept immediate hardship for the sake of future economic gain beneficial to both countries. The larger issue is whether those reasons are of sufficient import to forego the benefits that arise from such investment. That question, too, is thoroughly addressed in Section V. In this section, I simply make the generic case that international altruism can effectively assist in the transition to a market economy and thus further the primary goals of both the United States and China.

China Growth Good – Global Economy 2/2

### China’s economy is key to the global economy

Dodd, Senior Democractic Senator, Chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury, ’07 (Christopher and Henry, January 31, “Sen. Christopher J. Dodd holds a hearing on the U.S.-China strategic economic dialogue” Congressional Quarterly, Senate Banking Committee, lexis)

Mr. Chairman, America's economy and workers benefit significantly from our trade with China. China is our fourth largest export market. Our exports to China have increased more than 350 percent of the last decade, six times the growth of our exports to the rest of the world, and nearly half of our exports to China are capital goods, including high value-added goods, such as civilian aircraft, electrical machinery and medical devices. I believe that strongly that a healthy Chinese economy, growing without large external imbalances, is of vital interest to the people of the United States, to the people of China, and to the global economy as a whole. More currency flexibility in the short-term and a fully market determined floating RMB in the intermediate term are essential to accomplish this goal. So is restructuring the Chinese economy so that the domestic consumption demand, not exports, fuels China's growth. Broad structural changes are necessary to have a major impact on our trade deficit with China. PAULSON: The next round of the SED will take place here in Washington in May. I understand that all of your constituents are very concerned about the impact of our relationship with China on their jobs and on their livelihoods. China is a big and important part of the world economy. It needs a currency whose value is determined in an open, competitive marketplace and an economy that supports more balanced, table growth. I look forward to working with the members of this distinguished committee on the many important issues we have before us and I now welcome your questions.

## China Growth Good – Regime Collapse

### And it prevents regime collapse

Hurst, Political-Military Research Analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security & Lieutenant Commander in the Navy Reserve, 2K6 (Cindy, “China’s Oil Rush in Africa,” IAGS Energy Security, July, http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/chinainafrica.pdf)

China’s exploding economy could potentially result in an economic and socioeconomic crisis if China is not able to obtain the resources necessary to support it. Oil is at the forefront of China’s requirements list, being integral to a myriad of industrial and consumer needs. China’s oil stockpiles are currently very low. According to Greg Priddy, a consultant for the Energy Information Administration, should it somehow lose part of its oil supply, an authoritarian state like China, with parts of it still run as a command economy, would probably have fuel rationing. Fuel would be allocated to essential transportation activities, such as the delivery of food and other necessities, while private citizens would be denied. China is “extremely vulnerable to that. It cannot deal with that for any length of time, probably just a couple of weeks,” Priddy said.49 Should such rationing occur, it could cause widespread panic leading to rebellion, which could be a dagger in the Chinese government’s belly as it loses its edge over the people.

### Billions die

Renxin, Journalist, 8-3-2K5 (San, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death,” Epoch Times, www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives. As the CCP is known to be a clique with a closed system, it is extraordinary for it to reveal its top secret on its own. One might ask: what is the CCP’s purpose to make public its gambling plan on its deathbed? The answer is: the “speech” would have the effect of killing three birds with one stone. Its intentions are the following: Expressing the CCP’s resolve that it “not be buried by either heaven or earth” (direct quote from the “speech”). But then, isn’t the CCP opposed to the universe if it claims not to be buried by heaven and earth? Feeling the urgent need to harden its image as a soft egg in the face of the Nine Commentaries. Preparing publicity for its final battle with mankind by threatening war and trumpeting violence. So, strictly speaking, what the CCP has leaked out is more of an attempt to clutch at straws to save its life rather than to launch a trial balloon. Of course, the way the “speech” was presented had been carefully prepared. It did not have a usual opening or ending, and the audience, time, place, and background related to the “speech” were all kept unidentified. One may speculate or imagine as one may, but never verify. The aim was obviously to create a mysterious setting. In short, the “speech” came out as something one finds difficult to tell whether it is false or true.

## China Growth Good – South China Sea

### Chinese growth stops South China Sea war

The China Post ’11 (“South China Sea disputes threaten peace: Clinton” http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional-news/2011/07/24/310861/South-China.htm, 7/24)

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded to the renewed pressure by insisting that China would work to ensure the tensions did not escalate into conflict. “South China Sea and Asia as a whole are peaceful and stable, and this will continue through our joint efforts,” Yang told reporters on the sidelines of the forum. “China will continue to contribute to peace and stability in Asia.” At a meeting with the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Bali on Wednesday, China also agreed to a set of guidelines setting a framework for an eventual code of conduct for the sea. China and some ASEAN members hailed this as a breakthrough that could defuse the tensions.

### Tensions in the South China Sea have been rising, and will prompt regional arms race.

Glaser, 6-30-2011 (Bonnie, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, CSIS, “Tensions Flare in the South China Sea”, <http://csis.org/publication/tensions-flare-south-china-sea>, doa 7-25-11)

Tensions have been building in the South China Sea and, if left unattended, could sour relations in the region, prompt a regional arms race, and even worse, spark a military conflict. Encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan with a total of around 1,350,000 square miles, the South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs and sandbars, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The waters of the South China Sea are not only some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes; they are also a repository for valuable natural resources, including fish, minerals, and potentially large deposits of oil and natural gas. Competing territorial claims over parts or all of the South China Sea have been made by China, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. Military clashes of varying severity occurred in the South China Sea beginning with China’s use of military force against Vietnamese troops to enforce its claim to the Paracel Islands in 1974. Another confrontation took place between Chinese and Vietnamese forces over the occupation of Johnson South Reef (chigua jiaohai) in 1988, resulting in the sinking of three Vietnamese vessels, killing seventy-two people. In 1994, China built structures on Mischief Reef, which is well within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Incidents involving fishing boats and, in some cases, naval vessels continued through the 1990s, but friction waned in the early 2000s, primarily due to China’s adoption of a diplomatic offensive aimed at reassuring the ASEAN countries that China’s rise would be peaceful. The November 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was a watershed agreement, albeit non-binding, that was intended to freeze the status quo and encourage cooperative confident-building measures among the disputants. Tensions flared, however, in 2007, as a result of Chinese demarches to foreign oil companies engaged in joint ventures with Vietnam to develop two gas fields that Hanoi claimed were well within its EEZ. That same year Chinese naval patrol vessels fired on a Vietnamese fishing boat, killing one sailor; China launched tourist cruises to the Paracels; and China’s National People’s Congress passed a law creating a county-level city in Hainan province called Sansha to administer China’s claims in the South China Sea, prompting anti-China protests in Vietnam.1 Also in 2007, Vietnam issued a new maritime strategy that emphasized developing South China Sea resources, which Beijing viewed as provocative. In 2009-2010, Chinese authorities detained an unusually large number of Vietnamese trawlers in waters near the Paracels and expanded deployments of large fishery patrol vessels to the Spratly Islands to protect Chinese fishing boats. Vietnam claimed an extended continental shelf at the UN and launched a campaign to “internationalize” the South China Sea issue, beginning with a conference held in November 2009 in Hanoi. The joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam in May 2009 to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) also contributed to renewed friction. The claim covered the seabed resources of the southern part of the South China Sea in disregard of the other interested parties, Brunei, China and the Philippines. As such, it can be argued that the submission was contrary to the spirit of Article 5 of the DOC that calls for self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes.2 China issued a strong protest, claiming that the submission “seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea.” Observing the escalating tensions in the South China Sea, Obama administration officials concluded that U.S. policy, which emphasized American neutrality in the territorial disputes, was no longer sufficient; the deteriorating situation required that the U.S. state its interests clearly and publicly. At the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in Hanoi in July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton maintained that the US had a “national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” She expressed support for the DoC and offered assistance “to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration.” Clinton did not alter the US long-standing neutral position on the territorial disputes in the region and did not take a position on how the disputes should be resolved. Rather, she emphasized the necessity of resolving disputes without the use or threat of force and stated that “claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”3 Following Clinton’s address, twelve other nations mentioned concerns about stability in the South China Sea. In his rebuttal, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi insisted that the situation in the South China Sea was peaceful and cautioned against internationalizing the territorial disputes. He accused Secretary Clinton of launching an “attack” on China that was “designed to give the international community a wrong impression that the situation in the South China Sea is a cause for grave concern.4 The waters of the South China Sea remained relatively calm in the second half of 2010, but churned again in 2011. The Philippines opted in February to begin exploration activities in the Reed Bank, a group of small islets west of the Philippine Island of Palawan. On March 2, two Chinese patrol boats reportedly threatened to ram a survey ship that was chartered by a UK-based oil and gas company which had conducted seismic studies that had indicated the presence of 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas and was undertaking work to identify locations for appraisal wells to be sunk. The Chinese vessels ordered the survey ship to cease its activities because the area was under Chinese jurisdiction5. On May 26, Hanoi accused Chinese vessels of severing the cables of a Petro Vietnam survey ship. A similar incident occurred again two weeks later. The Vietnamese insisted that the area in which the survey was taking place was inside its EEZ and had not been previously contested and charged Beijing with seeking to “turn undisputed areas into disputed areas.” China’s foreign ministry spokesman claimed that armed Vietnamese ships were chasing a Chinese fishing vessel from the area and a fishing net accidentally became entangled with the cable of the “illegally operating” oil-exploration vessel. From Beijing’s perspective, Vietnam and the Philippines are violating an understanding to forego unilateral development of maritime resources. China maintains that it is justified in protecting Chinese fishing vessels, enforcing an annual fishing ban near the Paracels, and harassing foreign energy companies to suspend exploration work in disputed areas. In the face of perceived challenges to its jurisdictional authority, the Chinese continue to reiterate their claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea. Beijing bases its claim on initial discovery and historical arguments that it traces to the second century B.C. A map originally drawn up by the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1947 depicts China’s claim. It shows nine unconnected lines that cover almost the entire South China Sea. The Chinese government remains deliberately ambiguous about the exact meaning of the nine-dotted line. Since there is no consensus government position, Chinese analysts provide different explanations. Some experts claim that the lines convey full sovereignty over the waters and all land and sub-sea features within. Others contend that the line delineates ownership of the islands within the dotted lines, but not sovereignty over the sea itself. Another school of thought maintains that the significance of the dotted lines lies in their delineation of China’s historical legacy in the South China Sea.

## China Growth Good – Nationalism

### Turn – Economic growth prevents Chinese nationalism

IHT, ’04 (August 17, “China’s New Power Can Be Contained” International Herald Tribune, p 8, lexis)

Nationalist sentiments are sprouting in Northeast Asia. There is nothing inevitable about their growth from minor irritants into major problems. Even U.S. troop reductions in the region should not exacerbate the situation, provided that the United States and Japan maintain a firm strategic posture that acknowledges China's new power but sets limits on its exercise. Essential, too, is determination to avoid confrontation with China on economic issues and access to raw materials, which could stir Chinese nationalism to fever pitch just as they did in 1930s Japan. The outward signs range from the xenophobic anti-Japanese behavior of Chinese soccer crowds to a Korea-China spat over the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo, now part of China's Manchuria. In Japan, a younger generation is tiring of never-ending Chinese demands for apologies for their great-grandparents' deeds and is conscious that Japan is unable defend itself without U.S. support. The biggest source of danger is not simply the emergence of a China with strategic nuclear weapons, a plethora of missiles facing Taiwan and a growing blue-water fleet. Those are inevitable consequences of China's self-styled "peaceful rise." They should only be a threat if power struggles within China, or economic disruptions stemming from global problems, cause China to shift its focus from satisfying its new materialism to satisfying nationalist urges. Even now, when China's economic success is so apparent, rivalry between the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and the old boss, former President Jiang Zemin, using his position as head of the Central Military Commission, expresses itself in terms of military posturing and rhetoric toward Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan and Japan are inextricably linked not only in the minds of Chinese nationalists but also in those of Japanese defense planners. Japan may not care much about Taiwan's identity, but it does care about Taiwan's geography. Taiwan is as close to Japan's Ryukyu islands as it is to the Chinese mainland, and it controls the Luzon Straits, which give access to the South China Sea and Japan's trade partners in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. China claims that Asia fears renewed Japanese militarism. But Southeast Asia is more worried about China's territorial sea claims and its search for raw materials than about Japan, which is preoccupied with protecting its trade and investments. Japan's conventional arms build-up has been quieter but as significant as that of China. Its naval capability is particularly impressive. But its continued partnership with the United States on nuclear issues and the missile defense shield remains critical to its own defense and, arguably, that of Taiwan. That alliance remains crucial if Japan is not to go its own way on nuclear and strategic weapons, raise tensions and perhaps send China into a dangerous spasm of xenophobia. The U.S. decision to reduce troop strength in Asia is not important in itself, but any domestic U.S. reaction against failures in Iraq which severely reduced America's strategic role in East Asia would be destabilizing. Chinese nationalism could burst out anyway if China's economic hopes were dashed by global recession, a world energy crisis or a trade war with a United States that took unilateral measures to correct its huge imbalance with China.

### Nuclear war

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 7-25-2K5 (“Bombs and Butter”)

As China gains power, that nationalism becomes more worrisome. China's authoritarian government lacks the natural restraint of voters or of dissenters free to challenge government assumptions that can lead to war. The Pentagon recently reported that China is rapidly building its military with a goal of extending its influence across Asia. In the future, its leaders "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests or resolve disputes," the report concluded. If more muscle combined with nationalist passions tempt Chinese leaders to attack Taiwan, the United States and the world would be faced with a crisis more serious than any since at least the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union. The United States would feel compelled to come to Taiwan's aid, resulting in a war between heavily armed countries that possess nuclear arsenals.

## China Growth Good – Asian Stability

### Turn – Chinese growth critical to alleviating poverty and Asian conflicts

Griswold, Director of the Center for Trade Polict Studies at the Cato Institute, ’03 (Daniel, September 15, “Why Trade with the PRC?” <http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles/dg-9-15-03>)

Second, even if we could slam the brakes on China’s economic growth, would we want to? A dramatic slowdown would cause hardship for hundreds of millions of Chinese families and condemn millions of children to lives of perpetual poverty without the hope of further education and upward mobility. A poor, stagnant, and frustrated China would be more unstable and hostile to American interests than an energetic and prosperous one. A policy of disengagement from China would probably create the very enemy its proponents claim to be protecting us from. China’s burgeoning commercial ties have already moderated its international behavior. The incident surrounding the downing of a surveillance plane over China early in President Bush’s term was resolved quickly in some measure due to China’s growing commerce with the United States. And, China is finally playing a constructive role in policing Asia’s true problem child, North Korea, in part because South Korea is now among its top five trading partners. Its equally huge trade and investment ties to Taiwan give the Chinese government a powerful reason to avoid military conflict over the island.

### Nuclear war

Kennedy, Professor of History at Yale University, ’00 (Paul, January 10, “21st Century – Dialogues on the Future/Globalization’s Sway in Evolution for State Put in Focus” Daily Yomiuri, p. 1)

Kennedy: I do not think that we should discuss only positive aspects of globalization. Today, there is an arms race going among many Asian countries. There is also a nationalist passion at work in the region. All this comes with incredible pressure in the form of environmental problems, population growth and ethnic violence. This might well mean that some nuclear weapons could be let off in Asia, while a very big war could occur in the area by 2010 or 2015.

## A2: Environment

### China determined to become a low carbon economy

Travis Donovan 06/21/11 04:45 AM ET, China Climate Change Conference Announced: Country 'Determined To Develop A Low Carbon Economy’, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/21/china-climate-change-conference-2011\_n\_881161.html

Chinese officials announced Wednesday a three-day international conference to discuss how to address climate change, while conveying to the world that China is determined to develop a low-carbon economy. Representatives from 30 international organizations and 10 areas and countries will attend the conference in Beijing starting Wednesday, said Huang Wenhang of the National Development and Reform Commission, China's top economic planning body. She told a news conference that delegates would focus on policy measures for green carbon development, adapting to climate change and capacity building, including how to widen fundraising channels. Representatives from the United States, European Union, Britain, Canada, Italy and Sweden are scheduled to attend, while Huang said United Nations development and environment teams, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change would also at part. Other delegates include representatives from multinationals and Chinese companies, including BP and Chinese oil firms Sinopec and Petro China, she said. Su Wei, director general of the commission's climate change department, said they were not intending to deliver signals for the next major U.N. climate conference in Durban. "But what we would like to say and to convey the message is that China is paying a lot of attention and China is determined to develop a low carbon economy," he said. Su, who was China's chief negotiator at last year's U.N. climate conference in Cancun, said delegates would discuss how to reduce emissions while continuing to develop an economy and how to encourage the development of the renewable energy industry. He said they could also share thoughts on an early-warning system to predict climatem change and extreme weather events.

## Collapse Inevitable

### Fiscal policy instability means boom-bust cycles are inevitable

Enzio Von Pfeil, Chairman and CEO of Commercial Economics in Hong Kong, 6/24/2004 (“Breaking the Cycle: Chinese Governance and Economic Fluctuations”, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief v4n13,

<http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=2998&article_id=2368156>)

What do these examples have to do with China's economic boom and bust cycle? Simply put, without a central authority with the ability to impose its agenda on regional and metropolitan authorities, these entities will continue to follow their local interests, thereby derailing any attempts at a unified national policy. The issue of center versus periphery brings to the fore another topic of debate: centralization versus decentralization. In China, the tug of war between localities/provinces and center has not been resolved, and remains a major hindrance to the effective implementation of sound fiscal policy.

A second structural hurdle that stands in the way of mediating China's boom-bust cycles is the ultimate authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP's ultimate control over all aspects of governance practically inhibits the control of professionals over their area of expertise. For instance, in the case of the Yunnan dam project, members of the Nuking Communist Party Committee support continued construction. However, the extent to which these individuals have training in issues such as environmental planning, engineering, or economics is questionable. Moreover, party bosses have a very different agenda from professionals. By building the dam, party officials hope to alleviate regional poverty. An economist who thinks the dam would create bubbles of economic prosperity that would ultimately be detrimental to the overall economy would have no authority over local party bosses when it came to curtailing the project.

A final structure fueling boom-bust cycles is the lack of clear lines of responsibility. Lieberthal calls this "matrix muddle." A prime example would be the Ministerial rank of the provinces and certain cities. Directives from the Central Ministry in Beijing must compete for authority over issues with the interests of local/provincial governors. When we add to this authority overlap the power of Party officials, the decision-making system becomes quite byzantine. When we finally consider the fact that the political system duplicates itself at all territorial levels – from province to county to city to danwei (local unit) – any one person may have several different bosses. Depending on one's allies and enemies, different decisions can be made by different people for different reasons.

Without a clear chain of command and clear lines for the division of authority, policies cannot be implemented in a coherent and total fashion. By way of contrast, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) handles all matters relating to American trade policy. While other trade organs "feed" their views into the USTR office, the U.S. Trade Representative is ultimately in charge of all trade matters. These matters are his responsibility. And again, while political appointees (whose qualifications may not necessarily be technically sound) run the U.S. Treasury, a marvelous wealth of technical talent exists within the department. China lacks a governance structure where a single entity has responsibility for decision making with regard to some issue. Nor does the decision-making within China's governance structures emanate from technically competent individuals.

## Burnout Turn

### Boosts in China’s economy inevitably lead to burn out – As Chinas economy grows it over extends itself and puts itself into a financial crisis – On brink now

Roubini 2011 (Nouriel American professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, an economic consultancy firm. China Bad Growth Plan April 18th 2011, http://www.pkarticleshub.com/2011/04/18/chinas-bad-growth-plan/)

China’s economy is overheating now, but, over time, its current over-investment will prove deflationary both domestically and globally. Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible — most likely after 2013 — China is poised for a sharp slowdown. Instead of focusing on securing a soft landing today, Chinese policymakers should be worrying about the brick wall that economic growth may hit in the second half of the quinquennium. Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. All historical episodes of excessive investment — including East Asia in the 1990s — have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth. To avoid this fate, China needs to save less, reduce fixed investment, cut net exports as a share of GDP, and boost the share of consumption. The trouble is that the reasons the Chinese save so much and consume so little are structural. It will take two decades of reforms to change the incentive to overinvest.

### Chinese economic booms lead to swift economic deterioration – the bigger the economy, the harder it will fall.

Levinson 2011 (David Associate Professor in the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Minnesota and Director of the Networks, Economics, and Urban Systems. April 11th 2008 China’s Bad Growth Bet http://blog.lib.umn.edu/levin031/transportationist/2011/04/chinas-bad-growth-bet.html)

"The problem, of course, is that no country can be productive enough to reinvest 50% of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering non-performing loan problem. China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure, and property. To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns, and brand-new aluminum smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging. Commercial and high-end residential investment has been excessive, automobile capacity has outstripped even the recent surge in sales, and overcapacity in steel, cement, and other manufacturing sectors is increasing further. In the short run, the investment boom will fuel inflation, owing to the highly resource-intensive character of growth. But overcapacity will lead inevitably to serious deflationary pressures, starting with the manufacturing and real-estate sectors."

## China Growth Bad – Sino-India War 1/2

### Sino-India conflicts on brink, both are bolstering boarders.

Curtis and Cheng 7/18 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/07/The-China-Challenge-A-Strategic-Vision-for-US-India-Relations; The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.–India Relations; Lisa Curtis and Dean Cheng (Research fellows); July 18, 2011)AM

India is keeping a wary eye on China’s rapid global ascent. Unresolved border issues that resulted in the Sino–Indian War of 1962 have been heating up again in recent years. Indian policymakers are scrambling to develop effective policies to cope with a rising China by simultaneously pursuing both a robust diplomatic strategy aimed at encouraging peaceful resolution of border disputes and forging strong trade and economic ties and an ambitious military modernization campaign that will build Indian air, naval, and missile capabilities. By bolstering its naval assets, India will solidify its position in the Indian Ocean and enhance its ability to project power into the Asia Pacific. New Delhi also will continue to boost its medium-range missile programs to deter Beijing and to strengthen its air capabilities to deal with potential flare-ups along their disputed borders. Meanwhile, China has also been paying increasing attention to India. China’s interests on its southern flank have led the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to strengthen its forces in the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions bordering India. The U.S. must keep a watchful eye on the trend lines in Sino–Indian relations and factor these into its overall strategies in the broader Asia region. A strong India able to hold its own against China is in America’s interest. China’s increased assertiveness in the East and South China Seas over the past year has been accompanied by a hardening position on its border disputes with India. Last summer, India took the unprecedented step of suspending military ties with China in response to Beijing’s refusal to grant a visa to an Indian Army general serving in Jammu and Kashmir. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to New Delhi last December helped tamp down the disagreement, and military contacts have since resumed. Still, . U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to India this week for Strategic Dialogue talks provides an opportunity to take India’s pulse on China and to discuss new diplomatic and security initiatives that will contribute to maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. The U.S. should demonstrate support for Indian military modernization and enhanced U.S.–Indian defense ties. Despite U.S. disappointment over India’s decision to de-select two American companies from its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition, the U.S. is bound to conclude other major defense deals with India as it pursues an ambitious defense modernization campaign, which includes spending plans of around $35 billion over the next five years. Indeed, this year, the two sides finalized a deal worth nearly $4 billion for the U.S. to provide India with enough C-17 aircraft to give India the second-largest C-17 fleet in the world. Enhancing Indo–U.S. cooperation in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region is also an area of mutual interest that is ripe for new initiatives. India’s rejection of the MMRCA has added a dose of realism to Indo–U.S. relations and reminded U.S. officials that the burgeoning partnership will not always reach the full expectations of either side. Still, the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China will inevitably drive the U.S. and India to increase cooperation in defense and other key sectors, such as space, maritime security, and nuclear nonproliferation.

China Growth Bad – Sino-India War 2/2

### A war between China and India involves every country in the region, creating a domino effect

Curtis and Cheng 7/18 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/07/The-China-Challenge-A-Strategic-Vision-for-US-India-Relations; The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.–India Relations; Lisa Curtis and Dean Cheng (Research fellows); July 18, 2011)AM

Contesting the Seas… Indo–Chinese strategic competition increasingly revolves around naval issues. India views with concern the Chinese military presence in and around the Indian Ocean and is carefully considering what it means for energy and sea-lane security. New Delhi is especially worried about Beijing’s potential naval expansion, including the development of its first aircraft carrier. India is steadily increasing its defense budgets and focusing particular attention on building up its naval capabilities. In February, New Delhi unveiled its 2011 budget with is striving to put into place three carriers by 2020 as part of its naval expansion and desire an 11 percent increase for defense. India’s rising defense budgets and growing navy have begun to concern Beijing, as China’s energy lifeline that passes through the Indian Ocean side of the Malacca Strait will increasingly be vulnerable to India’s naval presence.[28] India has the world’s fifth-largest navy.[29] It already has one aircraft carrier and to project power throughout the Indian Ocean. Difficulties in defense procurement and deficiencies in its own shipbuilding sector, however, could stall India’s progress in developing its naval capabilities.[30] India has also carefully cultivated ties with the countries of the Indian Ocean rim, including Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles, and Madagascar, providing these countries with naval support, such as offshore naval patrol vessels and staff and training.[31] In February 2008, India convened the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, inviting participants from the littoral states to discuss maritime security. The United Arab Emirates hosted the second conference in May 2010.[32] India is pursuing better ties with Vietnam to try to check Chinese naval influence and access to the Indian Ocean.[33] New Delhi initiated a new security partnership with Hanoi in 2000 that emphasized defense training, supply of advanced weaponry, and the potential for India to gain access to the South China Sea through the Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base. Indian officials have long understood the importance of Vietnam in the South China Sea and its potential to balance the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.[34] The Vietnamese have demurred on granting India access to Cam Ranh Bay, and the Vietnamese–Indian security partnership remains limited. Vietnam has supported India in its quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and has helped to block Pakistan’s bid for membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum. China, meanwhile, increasingly sees India as a maritime as well as a land threat. An assessment of the Indian military published by the PLA’s National Defense University Press observes that, since the 1970s, India has increasingly shifted its strategic attention toward the Indian Ocean.[35] In the Chinese view, this shift began in the wake of the 1971 Indo–Pakistani War, with increased construction of naval bases and forces and a concomitant expansion of Indian strategic guiding thoughts (zhanlue zhidao sixiang) to the Indian Ocean,[36] and accelerated in the 1980s with the dispatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka and the Maldives. While some of this naval effort is seen as being aimed at other states in the Indian Ocean region, especially Pakistan, the Chinese assessment also sees the Indian naval buildup as aimed at extra-regional military powers.

## China Growth Bad – Sino-Russia War 1/2

### Russia is wary of China expansionism – Russia has already made it clear they will side with India if China begins expansionist policies

Bin ‘7 (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0701qchina\_russia.pdf; Russia-China Relations; April 2007; Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations; China-Russia Relations: Russia Says “No” to the West, and “Sort of” to China; Yu Bin Professor, Department of Political Science. Director, East Asian Studies. Wittenberg Univeristy; pg 148-149)

There is no question that the mil-mil relationship remains healthy, and is growing and deepening. Russia, however, remains wary of China’s economic growth and its impact on China’s military posture. It appeared that the Russians were perhaps as surprised as the Americans by China’s successful anti-satellite test on Jan. 11. Some Russian analysts went as far as to suggest in February that China’s current conventional deployment and training in the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions targeted only Russia due to their proximity to the Russia’s Far East Military District. As a result, Russia “should have no illusions about the border treaty signed recently between Russia and China,” insisted Aleksandr Khramchikhin, head of the analytical department at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in the Moscow daily Izvestiya Feb. 13. “We had already signed the Treaty of Peking in 1860, followed by a number of protocols. In accordance with the agreements, the Amur islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriyskiy belonged unequivocally and incontestably to Russia. Now, they are Chinese (at present just half of the latter). If China becomes still stronger and Russia still weaker, they [the Chinese] will ‘ask’ for new territories. Will we really give them up once again without a murmur, as we did two years ago?” It is also well known that Russia has chosen India as its partner for joint research and development for the next generation of jet fighters and missiles. Even in the fast-growing economic relationship, Russia sees itself becoming a raw material supplier to China. Bilateral trade in 2006 grew by 15 percent to $33.4 billion. The proportion of machinery and equipment deliveries in Russia’s exports to China, however, fell by nearly 40 percent to $217 million, or only 1.2 percent of Russia’s overall exports to China compared with 2.1 percent in 2005. For many in Russia, the prospect of Russia becoming a raw material supplier to China is simply unacceptable, even if this has long been a fact of economic life in Russia’s trade relationship with the West. Energy cooperation is both mutually beneficial and mutually complementary if markets, not petropolitiks, dictate terms. After years of foot-dragging, Russia finally started building the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline (ESPO); 800 km had been completed by the end of the first quarter. Shortly before Hu’s state visit to Russia, a group from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) held a meeting with the Russian pipeline operator Transneft, and they felt “confident that the branch will be built.” [emphasis added] It is also unclear if Russia would remain competitive in China’s fast-growing nuclear power market following Russia’s withdrawal from tenders after China presented the bidders with extra conditions demanding complete technology transfers. In the end, Westinghouse won the $5.3 billion deal for four VP-1000 reactors with complete technology transfers. The distrust and lack of trust are particularly obvious at the societal level. Ordinary Russians and Chinese seem to be bypassing each other to Westernize and modernize. This may not necessarily be a “bad” thing if they no longer love or hate one another as much as in the past. The problem today is that they may not care much about each other. There are numerous reasons for misperceptions, distrust, and lack of attention to each other. The “best ever” bilateral relationship between the two nations, for one, is being fostered, maintained, and nurtured precisely at a time when their domestic political systems are so different: Russia has became a democracy, while China remained communist, though each departs from its own legacies on its own terms and at its own pace. This is compounded by China’s steady rise and Russia’s historical decline, leading to psychological discomfort for many in Russia. This, coupled with the ongoing de-population of Russia’s Far Eastern regions and a perceived illegal immigration “problem” there, is fanning a deeply seated Russian xenophobia.

China Growth Bad – Sino-Russia War 2/2

### Sino-Russia nuclear war

Sharavin 10-1-2K1 (Alexander, “The Third Threat,” What The Papers Say (Russia))

Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter. An aforementioned prospect is, undoubtedly, rather disagreeable and we would not like to believe it can be true. However, it is a realistic prospect - just like a war against NATO or Islamic extremists.

## China Growth Bad – South China Sea

### China growth causes resource conflict in South China Sea

Dick Nanto, specialist in industry and trade @ Congressional Research Service, and Radha Sinha, research associate @ Congressional Research Service, 11/20/00 (CRS Report: China’s Emergence as a Major Economic Power: Implications for US Interests, to obtain report contact your Member of Congress)

The second possible conflict stems from the combination of overlapping claims to certain islands in the East and South China Sea and rising Chinese demand for food grains, energy, and other mineral resources. Economic growth places China in a situation faced by all economies. As a country develops, it requires more resources, both real and financial, to operate. These resource needs can be supplied either domestically or through international trade and investments. On one hand, China’s rising demand for food is likely to make it increasingly dependent on the United States and other food exporters such as Canada and Australia who might be sympathetic to U.S. attempts to use trade as a weapon. This could make China more susceptible to economic sanctions and may establish political constituencies within China that oppose military or political actions that might jeopardize their sources of supply. On the other hand, China’s rising dependency on imported petroleum and raw materials could induce Beijing to seek to enforce its territorial claims over disputed islands in the Pacific, particularly the Spratly, Paracels (Xisha), and Daioyutai (Senkaku) islands. China would do so, however, at the risk of conflict with neighboring countries or even the United States.

### Tensions in the South China Sea have been rising, and will prompt regional arms race.

Glaser, 6-30-2011 (Bonnie, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, CSIS, “Tensions Flare in the South China Sea”, <http://csis.org/publication/tensions-flare-south-china-sea>, doa 7-25-11)

Tensions have been building in the South China Sea and, if left unattended, could sour relations in the region, prompt a regional arms race, and even worse, spark a military conflict. Encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan with a total of around 1,350,000 square miles, the South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs and sandbars, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The waters of the South China Sea are not only some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes; they are also a repository for valuable natural resources, including fish, minerals, and potentially large deposits of oil and natural gas. Competing territorial claims over parts or all of the South China Sea have been made by China, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. Military clashes of varying severity occurred in the South China Sea beginning with China’s use of military force against Vietnamese troops to enforce its claim to the Paracel Islands in 1974. Another confrontation took place between Chinese and Vietnamese forces over the occupation of Johnson South Reef (chigua jiaohai) in 1988, resulting in the sinking of three Vietnamese vessels, killing seventy-two people. In 1994, China built structures on Mischief Reef, which is well within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Incidents involving fishing boats and, in some cases, naval vessels continued through the 1990s, but friction waned in the early 2000s, primarily due to China’s adoption of a diplomatic offensive aimed at reassuring the ASEAN countries that China’s rise would be peaceful. The November 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was a watershed agreement, albeit non-binding, that was intended to freeze the status quo and encourage cooperative confident-building measures among the disputants. Tensions flared, however, in 2007, as a result of Chinese demarches to foreign oil companies engaged in joint ventures with Vietnam to develop two gas fields that Hanoi claimed were well within its EEZ. That same year Chinese naval patrol vessels fired on a Vietnamese fishing boat, killing one sailor; China launched tourist cruises to the Paracels; and China’s National People’s Congress passed a law creating a county-level city in Hainan province called Sansha to administer China’s claims in the South China Sea, prompting anti-China protests in Vietnam.1 Also in 2007, Vietnam issued a new maritime strategy that emphasized developing South China Sea resources, which Beijing viewed as provocative. In 2009-2010, Chinese authorities detained an unusually large number of Vietnamese trawlers in waters near the Paracels and expanded deployments of large fishery patrol vessels to the Spratly Islands to protect Chinese fishing boats. Vietnam claimed an extended continental shelf at the UN and launched a campaign to “internationalize” the South China Sea issue, beginning with a conference held in November 2009 in Hanoi. The joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam in May 2009 to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) also contributed to renewed friction. The claim covered the seabed resources of the southern part of the South China Sea in disregard of the other interested parties, Brunei, China and the Philippines. As such, it can be argued that the submission was contrary to the spirit of Article 5 of the DOC that calls for self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes.2 China issued a strong protest, claiming that the submission “seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea.” Observing the escalating tensions in the South China Sea, Obama administration officials concluded that U.S. policy, which emphasized American neutrality in the territorial disputes, was no longer sufficient; the deteriorating situation required that the U.S. state its interests clearly and publicly. At the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in Hanoi in July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton maintained that the US had a “national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” She expressed support for the DoC and offered assistance “to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration.” Clinton did not alter the US long-standing neutral position on the territorial disputes in the region and did not take a position on how the disputes should be resolved. Rather, she emphasized the necessity of resolving disputes without the use or threat of force and stated that “claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”3 Following Clinton’s address, twelve other nations mentioned concerns about stability in the South China Sea. In his rebuttal, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi insisted that the situation in the South China Sea was peaceful and cautioned against internationalizing the territorial disputes. He accused Secretary Clinton of launching an “attack” on China that was “designed to give the international community a wrong impression that the situation in the South China Sea is a cause for grave concern.4 The waters of the South China Sea remained relatively calm in the second half of 2010, but churned again in 2011. The Philippines opted in February to begin exploration activities in the Reed Bank, a group of small islets west of the Philippine Island of Palawan. On March 2, two Chinese patrol boats reportedly threatened to ram a survey ship that was chartered by a UK-based oil and gas company which had conducted seismic studies that had indicated the presence of 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas and was undertaking work to identify locations for appraisal wells to be sunk. The Chinese vessels ordered the survey ship to cease its activities because the area was under Chinese jurisdiction5. On May 26, Hanoi accused Chinese vessels of severing the cables of a Petro Vietnam survey ship. A similar incident occurred again two weeks later. The Vietnamese insisted that the area in which the survey was taking place was inside its EEZ and had not been previously contested and charged Beijing with seeking to “turn undisputed areas into disputed areas.” China’s foreign ministry spokesman claimed that armed Vietnamese ships were chasing a Chinese fishing vessel from the area and a fishing net accidentally became entangled with the cable of the “illegally operating” oil-exploration vessel. From Beijing’s perspective, Vietnam and the Philippines are violating an understanding to forego unilateral development of maritime resources. China maintains that it is justified in protecting Chinese fishing vessels, enforcing an annual fishing ban near the Paracels, and harassing foreign energy companies to suspend exploration work in disputed areas. In the face of perceived challenges to its jurisdictional authority, the Chinese continue to reiterate their claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea. Beijing bases its claim on initial discovery and historical arguments that it traces to the second century B.C. A map originally drawn up by the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1947 depicts China’s claim. It shows nine unconnected lines that cover almost the entire South China Sea. The Chinese government remains deliberately ambiguous about the exact meaning of the nine-dotted line. Since there is no consensus government position, Chinese analysts provide different explanations. Some experts claim that the lines convey full sovereignty over the waters and all land and sub-sea features within. Others contend that the line delineates ownership of the islands within the dotted lines, but not sovereignty over the sea itself. Another school of thought maintains that the significance of the dotted lines lies in their delineation of China’s historical legacy in the South China Sea.

## China Growth Bad – Nationalism

### Chinese economic growth fuels chinese nationalism

Carl S. Murphy, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, 1997 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Murphy.htm)

China's new prosperity has contributed to an unprecedented expansion of the economy and improvement in the lifestyle of the average Chinese. Increased economic strength has brought about increased pride in China's historical importance and future power. Resurgent pride is fueling nationalism and calls for the restoration of China to a greatness previously denied by Western imperialism and Japanese invasion. Economic growth has also provided The PRC with increasing resources with which to exploit opportunities for greater power and influence, including military modernization. Growth and its effect on nationalism have also built popular expectations for China's continued domestic improvement. If not satisfied, these expectations could generate increased dissatisfaction. One means to deflect anger in such a case would be to draw on nationalism and vilify an external target like the United States or Taiwan; distracting domestic discontent.

China's leaders have chosen an emotionally charged nationalistic goal to provide a unifying vision for the party and people alike: The restoration of China to its pre-Opium War boundaries and resumption of its rightful place as "a great nation." Observers in the West often discount the lingering bitterness with which the Chinese people regard over one hundred years of subjugation by outside, and predominately Western powers following the Opium Wars in the mid-1800's. China's resentment of Western imperialism is exceeded only by the well publicized rancor which remains as a result of Japan's invasion of China during the Second World War. As a result, the leadership in Beijing has embarked on a strategy to restore idealized territorial boundaries believed to exist prior to China's humiliating loss of sovereignty at western hands, concurrent with a military rejuvenation program. The regime's plan can be seen as a program to build a "rich country and strong army to guarantee that China will never again face similar treatment." The "century of humiliation" has embedded in Chinese political thinking a concept of absolute state sovereignty dating from the 19th century; a zero-sum competition between nations in which one nation's gain must mean the other's loss. Humiliation by empire building outsiders has taught China two lessons: power politics are all important in international relations and China will not receive the respect due a great nation without military power. In an address to the National People's Congress in January of 1995, Jiang Zemin, Chinese President and heir-apparent to Deng Xiaoping, articulated China's overarching drive toward repossession of historical territories and resumption of greatness as follows:

It remains the sacred mission and lofty goal of the entire Chinese people to achieve the reunification of the motherland and promote the all-round revitalization of the Chinese nation.

### Nuclear war

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 7-25-2K5 (“Bombs and Butter”)

As China gains power, that nationalism becomes more worrisome. China's authoritarian government lacks the natural restraint of voters or of dissenters free to challenge government assumptions that can lead to war. The Pentagon recently reported that China is rapidly building its military with a goal of extending its influence across Asia. In the future, its leaders "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests or resolve disputes," the report concluded. If more muscle combined with nationalist passions tempt Chinese leaders to attack Taiwan, the United States and the world would be faced with a crisis more serious than any since at least the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union. The United States would feel compelled to come to Taiwan's aid, resulting in a war between heavily armed countries that possess nuclear arsenals.

## China Growth Bad – Global Warming

### China economy leads to green house gas emissions and poverty, draining China of its resources and turning the case.

Blackwill, 09 – (former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf, WEA)

China is now the leading emitter of carbon dioxide. It has been the core manager of the six-party talks concerning North Korea. Reinforced by its sophisticated, reassuring, and eﬀ ective diplomacy, it is the most aggressive nation seeking energy and mineral resources in the world. By any measure, these are extraordinary statistics.Yet, China also has major vulnerabilities. It remains governed by an authoritarian regime. h e Communist Party has little organic legitimacy, and it seems questionable whether the Communist leadership now has “the Mandate of Heaven” with the people of China. Political reform moves at the speed of a glacier and there are tens of thousands of peasant protests each year. Decentralization to regional and local levels is now prevalent in China’s power and politics. From greenhouse emissions to national tax collection, the edicts of the central government are often ignored. Gaps between rich and poor grow dramatically, as do disparities between coastal and interior, western parts of the country. Some 140 million young men ﬂoat through China’s cities. h e Chinese population ages rapidly. there are serious shortages of internal energy resources and water supply, and there is profound environmental degradation.

### China economy kills the environment

(JIM YARDLEY ,October 30, 2005, China's Next Big Boom Could Be the Foul Air, Pg.2 NYTimes, http://www.faculty.coloradomtn.edu/jtroeger/business/assignments/week\_01/readings/China%20Next%20Big%20Boom%20could%20be%20Foul%20Air.pdf)

But one statistic offered last week by a top Chinese environmental official should stimulate genuine alarm inside and outside China. The official, Zhang Lijun, warned that pollution levels here could more than quadruple within 15 years if the country does not curb its rapid growth in energy consumption and automobile use. China, it seems, has reached a tipping point familiar to many developed countries, including the United States, that have raced headlong after economic development only to look up suddenly and see the environmental carnage. The difference with China, as is so often the case, is that the potential problems are much bigger, have happened much faster and could pose greater concerns for the entire world. "I don't think it will jump four or five times," Robert Watson, a senior scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council, said of the pollution prediction by Mr. Zhang. "But it could double or triple without too much trouble. And that's a scary thought, given how bad things are now." China is already the world's second-biggest producer of greenhouse gas emissions and is expected to surpass the United States as the biggest. Roughly a third of China is exposed to acid rain. A recent study by a Chinese research institute found that 400,000 people die prematurely every year in China from diseases linked to air pollution.

## A2: No Chinese Expansion

### China has made is clear that they are interested in keeping their land and would not hesitate to expand their boarders should the opportunity arrive.

Schmitt and Blumenthal ‘5 (Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project for the New American Century. Dan Blumenthal is resident fellow in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute and former senior director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Wishful Thinking in Our Time" Gary Schmitt & Dan Blumenthal The Weekly Standard August 8, 2005 http://www.newamericancentury.org/china-20050808.htm)

A more accurate picture would take note of China's noncompliance with its pledges to the World Trade Organization; its failure to use its leverage with North Korea to end Pyongyang's game of nuclear Russian roulette; its continuing refusal to abide by human rights and refugee conventions it has signed; its less-than-stellar nonproliferation record; its use of Chinese nationalism to browbeat Japan; its refusal to cooperate with the other great powers in the Proliferation Security Initiative; its obstructionist policies on Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma; and of course its repeated threats to use military force to unify Taiwan with the mainland--and, if need be, engage in nuclear brinkmanship to prevent the United States from intervening to stop a forcible reunification. It is this fuller--but unstated--account of Chinese behavior that fits with the substantive heart of the report, documenting China's rapid and dramatic improvements in military capabilities. What's new in this year's reoprt is the finding that China's military buildup has begun to have serious implications not only for the cross-strait balance of power but also for the region as a whole. The People's Liberation Army possesses a growing fleet of nuclear and diesel submarines, has 650-730 mobile ballistic missiles, and is working on aerial refueling for a significant percentage of its 2,600 combat aircraft. Toss in new and improved command, control, and communication systems and over-the-horizon targeting capabilities, and the picture that emerges is a China with military capabilities that are not just Taiwan-centric. While the report suggests that these capabilities "could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region . . . over the long term, if current trends persist," most regional militaries are already worried. When Chinese ships and subs begin making clandestine trips into Japanese home waters--as they have--the signal being sent to Japan and the region is clear enough. What's not new in the report is China's increasing military capacity to bring Taiwan to its knees. Last year's report judged that China could force Taiwan to accept unification with the mainland under certain conditions: "The campaign could succeed--barring third-party intervention--if Beijing were willing to accept the political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs that an invasion would produce." The point here is that Beijing does not believe a full-fledged invasion would be necessary to accomplish its goal. Rather, the PLA leadership, according to its own doctrinal papers, thinks a combination of ballistic-missile, special-operation, and aerial strikes could be sufficient to shock Taiwan's population and leadership into accepting Beijing's version of "one China." For similar reasons, China is working hard to develop the capacity to blockade Taiwan. The submarine modernization program that the report details is extensive. Eight new quiet KILO-class diesels will soon be added to the four already in the arsenal; China's indigenous SONG diesel is now in serial production; and a new diesel submarine, the YUAN class, was launched last year. Chinese naval journals indicate a deep interest in blockading operations, and pay close attention to the vulnerabilities of Taiwan's island economy. Such scenarios, of course, raise the question of what role the United States would or would not want to play in turning back Chinese aggression. Here, too, the answer is clear as day: China's military knows that it must be able to prevent, or, at least severely complicate, the American Navy's use of its aircraft carriers. To this end, as the new report spells out, China's antiship cruise missile force is growing by leaps and bounds. It has begun to field high-end, supersonic and subsonic cruise missiles on its new destroyers, attack boats, and submarines. It has even experimented with use of maneuverable, multiple-entry MRBMs and SRBMs to hit carrier battle groups. Once China solves the problem of longer-range detection and targeting, it will pose the most serious threat to American carriers in the world. And, in truth, when it comes to China's close-in waters, no serious American naval planner believes it would be safe sailing for American surface combatants, even as things stand today. As one PLA general remarked: "We have the ability to deal with an aircraft carrier that dares to get into our range of fire." The report also details China's programs to upgrade its intercontinental ballistic missile force with new solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles and new sea-based, submarine-launched systems. The net effect will be a more survivable, more accurate, and more lethal nuclear strategic capability--aimed primarily at the United States. As General Zhu Chenghu, dean of China's National Defense University, not so subtly reminded American visitors recently: Should the United States intervene in a conflict between China and Taiwan, "the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds . . . of [their] cities will be destroyed by the Chinese" nuclear weapons. Combine the PLA's fascination with "carrier killing," its ability to degrade severely the operational utility of U.S. air bases in Japan through missile strikes, its aggressive pursuit of space and counterspace capabilities, and its upgraded nuclear arsenal, and you have a military that believes it has or is close to having the means to make any American president think twice before going to Taiwan's rescue. Lazily, the U.S. government has accepted the Chinese propaganda line that these trends in Chinese military modernization are first designed to deter Taiwan "from moving toward de jure 'independence.'" Never mind that only a small minority in Taiwan supports taking that step (so even the most pro-independence politician in Taiwan would probably be unsuccessful in pushing the idea), China almost certainly would not be seeking these military capabilities to support a policy of mere deterrence. A few hundred missiles aimed at Taiwan could do that. Obviously, China is interested in deterring Taiwan from declaring independence, but, more significantly, it is interested in pursuing its stated goal of "reuniting" Taiwan with the motherland--and it is in relation to this goal that the PLA's actions and plans make sense. The Chinese Communist leadership has made clear time and again that it will not tolerate a prolonged separation of Taiwan from the mainland, and it has tasked the PLA, as earlier Pentagon reports indicated, with providing real military options. As this year's report notes (and as China's recent adoption of the Anti-Secession law essentially codifies): "The Chinese Communist Party came to power on its credentials as a defender of Chinese sovereignty; its leaders appear to see progress--or perhaps, the absence of failure--on the Taiwan issue as affecting the legitimacy of their rule." But rather than face the facts presented in the report about the character and scope of China's military buildup, the tendency in the senior ranks of the administration is to wash over them with sound bites about our relationship with China being "good but complex." Or worse. The day after the report was issued, in response to a question about the cross-strait military balance, Marine general Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said, "There's lots of countries in the world that have the capacity to wage war," but "very few have the intent to do so. . . . There's absolutely no reason for us to believe there is any intent on [China's] part." Absolutely? For one thing, as these annual Pentagon reports have repeatedly pointed out, China shrouds its military plans and senior decision-making in secrecy. But what we can observe could hardly lead anyone to think that we should be so confident about China's intentions. After all, this is the country that now ranks third in the world in overall defense spending, and the one that has increased its military budget fastest over the past decade, with growth in military expenditures outpacing even China's own remarkable growth in GDP. General Pace had better hope his statement doesn't go down in history alongside George Tenet's now infamous, "It's a slam dunk, Mr. President."

### China uses expansionist policies to gain resources – Growth would increase the rate at which it all is happening

Claremont Institute 2k (China, Russia and the New Geopolitics of Power; http://www.claremont.org/projects/pageid.1875/default.asp; May 31, 2000; The Claremont Institute for the Study of Statemanship and Political Philosophy)AM

To raise the threshold and risk of U.S. intervention in the Far East, China is investing heavily in naval platforms with stand-off weapons. It is building a domestic shipbuilding and aircraft-production base. In the meantime, the People's Republic of China has just taken delivery of the first of two modern 6,000-ton Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, capabale of launching the SS-N-22 "Sunburn" supersonic anti-ship missile. Recent reports in the Russian press indicate that China has purchased the aircraft carrier Kiev. And according to the forthcoming Jane's Fighting Ships, 2000-2001, China now has amphibious lift capable of transporting 11,000 troops and 250 main battle tanks. Perhaps most troubling, China has evinced a particular interest in "asymmetric warfare," the "other side" of the so-called "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). For example, Beijing is investigating how weaker powers can defeat stronger ones by "crippling attacks" on the latter's information systems, and accordingly, is pursuing anti-satellite, anti-radar, anti-stealth and anti-computer techniques designed to deny the United States the ability to operate close to the Asian littoral. While the Chinese modernization program may be understood as the logical consequence of China's determination to exert its claim over Taiwan without the interference of the United States, the dynamic at work here is moving the United States and China toward confrontation. In its quest for energy security, China has pursued a strategy of expansion toward the South, portending conflict between China and the United States because it places China astride the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) that link the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Not only has Beijing attempted to enforce its claims to the Spratly Islands and other areas of the South China Sea, believed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, it has also increased its military presence on the western side of the Southeast Asian peninsula. This activity potentially improves China's overall strategic position in Southeast Asia by linking the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.